Introduction
Insolvency laws in general and corporate insolvency/restructuring regimes in particular are economically important. Most recently, the OECD has published a study that attempts to link key desirable features of insolvency/restructuring laws with productivity growth in 36
countries. The study finds significant cross-country differences in the extent to which insolvency regimes promote an orderly exit of non-viable firms, indicating that some countries have scope to improve resource allocation and productivity through reforms of insolvency laws and procedures.
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The European legal landscape with respect to corporate insolvency/restructuring regimes is characterised by significant diversity. European corporate insolvency law never had its 'Centros moment' following which free choice of the applicable insolvency regime could (suddenly) have become feasible for entrepreneurs and, as a consequence, regulatory competition between the Member States on a significant scale could have ensued. On the contrary: the European lawmaker is involved in a long-haul harmonisation project, attempting to edge out differences between Member States' systems so that local businesses get local access to efficient insolvency regimes.
A first important step in this direction was taken in 2002 with the entry into force of the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR).
2 It was designed to eliminate forum shopping (Recital 4) and to harmonise Member States' jurisdiction and conflicts rules for international insolvencies. However, in practice, it did not achieve this end. Indeed, forum shopping became almost a signature feature of the EIR-both with respect to individual and corporate insolvencies-, and the UK emerged as the 'market leader' for corporate restructurings in the European Union (EU).
This essay discusses the rise of regulatory competition in corporate insolvency law in the EU, and how the UK came to be the preferred European venue for corporate restructurings. The regulatory landscape for corporate insolvency law in the EU is changing.
The EIR was recast in 2017, 3 the EU passed a 'European Restructuring Directive' (ERD) in 2019, 4 seeking to harmonise Member States' pre-insolvency restructuring regimes, and the UK will probably leave the EU in 2019. This essay investigates how these events will affect regulatory competition in corporate insolvency law in the EU. It hypothesises that this competition will be weaker in the future and that the UK will lose its dominant market position. I present evidence to support this hypothesis.
I begin by setting out a simple conceptual framework for assessing regulatory competition in corporate insolvency law in Section 2. This is followed by a discussion of the evolution of corporate insolvency law and practice in the EU in Section 3 and of regulatory competition under the 'original' EIR in Section 4. This discussion is based on known facts.
By contrast, in Sections 5, 6 and 7, I investigate how three key regulatory events-the recasting of the EIR in 2017, the ERD in 2019, and Brexit-are likely to affect regulatory competition and the market for corporate restructurings in the EU. The key claim here is that there will be less regulatory competition and that the UK will almost certainly lose its dominant market position. Recent data on the decline of the popularity of the English Scheme of Arrangement for foreign firms can be interpreted as a first piece of evidence to support this hypothesis. Section 8 concludes.
Regulatory Competition in Corporate Insolvency Law
Regulatory competition between states in a particular area of the law presupposes first, a diversity of legal rules that are 'on offer', second, incentives for states to compete with each other, and third, feasibility of choice by market actors. The phenomenon was initially studied with respect to the market for corporate charters in the US where Delaware enjoys a dominant position.
5 By now, the scholarship on the transnational 'law market' is vast, comprising conceptual, empirical and normative studies relating to many different areas of the law and geographical regions.
6
One of the key issues in the analysis of regulatory competition is externalities. 7 One can only hope for an efficient outcome if all-positive and negative-effects of actions by market participants are factored into the decision-making process for a particular legal regime.
If affected parties consent to the choice of the applicable law, it may be inferred that this choice is probably beneficial overall.
In the corporate insolvency context, the 'insolvency decision' is usually taken by the debtor's management and/or senior lenders ('case placers'). 8 The key stakeholder group one must be concerned with is outside creditors. There are various ways to get them involved so that credit risk is efficiently priced. If firms were allowed to choose the applicable insolvency regime in their charter/statutes ex ante-this proposal has been discussed in the literature for a long time 9 -, at least contract creditors could be said to have 'consented' to the specified regime. However, so far, jurisdictions worldwide have not allowed such an ex ante choice.
The issue becomes even more problematic if the choice is exercised ex post, i.e. once a corporation already finds itself in financial distress. Two scenarios or versions of insolvency forum shopping must be distinguished. In the first scenario, a firm seeks access to a non-5 For a recent account see Kahan (2018) . 6 For an overview see Eidenmüller (2011) . For a philosophical critique of the 'law market' see Stark (2019) . 7 As will become clearer later in the text in Section 4, an overall normative assessment of regulatory competition has of course to go beyond externalities. However, potential externalities are a key factor and useful starting point for the analysis. 8 Senior lenders usually bargain for contractual rights to be involved in the 'insolvency decision'. Even if they don't have these rights, they will usually be involved as a source of fresh money to finance the debtor's operations during the insolvency process. 9 Rasmussen (1992) ; Rasmussen (1997); Eidenmüller (2005) .
domestic (new) insolvency regime by reincorporating in the target jurisdiction, effectively changing its corporate form, i.e. the corporate laws applicable to it. This is feasible in the EU under the 'Cross-Border Mergers Directive' which now has become part of the 'Company Law Codification Directive' (CLCD): 10 a shell corporation is set up in the target jurisdiction, and the distressed firm is then merged with the shell corporation. The Directive contains a number of procedural safeguards to protect creditors' interests before a merger is allowed to go forward.
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The second scenario involves a change of a corporation's 'Centre of Main Interests'
(COMI)-the key jurisdictional test under the EIR-without a change of the corporate form.
From an outside creditor's perspective, such a change is more problematic than a cross-border merger as the procedural safeguards mentioned do not apply to such 'isolated COMI shifts'.
However, Member States' courts may scrutinise forum shopping by applying general principles of EU law such as the doctrine of abuse of law, at least in extreme cases. 12 Under this doctrine, COMI shifts undertaken purely to enrich certain stakeholders at the expense of others could be considered abusive. 13 As a consequence, the insolvency courts in the target jurisdiction would decline to exercise jurisdiction.
The Evolution of Corporate Insolvency Law and Practice in the EU
Corporate insolvency practice in the EU has changed significantly in the last two decades.
The first change relates to the relevance of corporate restructurings compared to liquidations. 19 By comparison with the 'incorporation doctrine', which is prevalent in common law jurisdictions, the 'real seat doctrine' is supposed to provide a more stable connecting factor, making forum shopping more difficult.
Despite this explicit policy of reducing or even eliminating forum shopping, such forum shopping started to occur. The main reason for this was (and is) that the COMI test is factsensitive and involves a tricky balancing exercise of many relevant factors such as, for example, the place of executive decision-making and the location of a firm's main creditors and/or assets. This opens up room for strategically motivated manipulations of the relevant criteria. The main forum shoppers where (and are) large corporations: the fixed costs of insolvency forum shopping are high, and these can more economically be incurred by large corporations. 20 At the same time, the size of the benefits of forum shopping also matters.
These are especially high when members of a group of companies simultaneously find themselves in financial distress and need to be restructured. In such a case, the better coordination of multiple proceedings over the assets of many companies translates into significant economic benefits for the group and its creditors.
As already mentioned, insolvency forum shopping may involve a reincorporation and an associated change of the corporate law applicable to the distressed firm (see Section 2 supra). Examples of this type of forum shopping are the German firms Schefenacker plc and DNick Holding plc which were reincorporated as English public limited companies before 18 In the recast EIR, this has now been incorporated with minor changes in Article 3(1). 19 In Germany, for example, the Federal Supreme Court still applies the test to non-EU companies, see Federal Supreme Court, Judgment of 27 October 2008 (Trabrennbahn), II ZR 158/06. 20 It is interesting to contrast this with the post-Centros regulatory competition in corporate law. This type of regulatory competition in the EU involves mostly start-ups. The costs of incorporating in a foreign jurisdiction are much smaller than the costs involved in a change of a firm's COMI. On European regulatory competition in corporate law and the reasons why the UK became the 'market leader' for incorporations see Becht, Mayer and Wagner (2008) .
being restructured in the UK. 21 An example of forum shopping without reincorporation is the restructuring of the PIN group. The holding company, PIN Group S.A., had been incorporated in Luxembourg but filed for bankruptcy in Germany after moving its COMI to Cologne in Germany.
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Crucially, forum shopping is neither always good or bad-it can be either, depending of the circumstances of the case. 23 In the PIN Group case, for example, the change in the holding company's COMI was motivated by a desire to consolidate most of the insolvency proceedings over the group's companies in Cologne-thereby achieving procedural efficiency gains for the benefit of the group's creditors. By contrast, Hans Brochier Holdings Limited, a
Nuremberg-based construction company, filed for bankruptcy in the UK in 2006 despite the fact that its COMI was clearly located in Germany. This attempt to defraud (most of)
Brochier's creditors was ultimately defeated. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396618
Source: OECD (2018) at p. 103
As can probably be expected, the normative assessment of the UK's dominance of the European corporate restructuring market is difficult: Many different factors influence the efficiency calculus, and objective ways of gauging their (quantitative) weight does not exist.
We know that easy access to limited liability, discharge and restructuring procedures fosters entrepreneurship. 29 At the same time, we also know from the OECD study that the UK has quite a lot of 'zombie firms', defined as firms that are older than 10 years and exhibit an interest coverage ratio (EBIT/interest expense) below 1 over three consecutive years:
29 Armour and Cummings (2008); Braun, Eidenmüller, Engert and Hornuf (2012 if a company registered in a third country jurisdiction-such as in the US-was involved.
Hence, 'non-EU' trumped 'EU' for the purpose of the coding.
Source: Amit Zac, Westlaw UK search (2019) The data clearly shows that the Scheme is a popular restructuring tool. Indeed, the long-term trend is positive. At the same time, the data also reveals that for the subset of EU firms, the curve is bell-shaped-it peaks in 2015/2016, and the Scheme's popularity for EU firms is in decline since then. Clearly, the overall numbers are quite small and one should not read too Brexit, which is also due to happen in 2019. I will examine these regulatory events in turn.
Whereas the analysis so far was based largely on known facts, the following analysis will involve mostly hypotheses which can and should be tested once sufficient data is available.
The recast European Insolvency Regulation (2017)
The recasting of the EIR in 2017 was the long-term consequence of a review process which was mandated by Article 46 of the 'original' EIR. According to this provision, "… the Commission shall present to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee a report on the application of this Regulation. The report shall be accompanied if need be by a proposal for adaptation of this Regulation." The reform discussion centred around three issues: the scope of the Regulation, the treatment of groups of companies, and forum shopping.
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The scope of the 'original' EIR was restricted to "… collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator"
(Article 1(1)). Following the development of the restructuring practice discussed in Section 3 supra, the European lawmaker broadened the scope of the Regulation. It now encompasses proceedings that are initiated pre-insolvency and that do not necessarily affect all creditors of 36 For a discussion of various reform proposals, see Eidenmüller (2013) . For an analysis of the main structural changes introduced by the recast EIR, see van Zwieten (2016).
a debtor company, 37 and it also encompasses proceedings during which the debtor 'stays in possession', i.e. no insolvency administrator is appointed ('DIP proceedings'). Interestingly, the Scheme of Arrangement is not within the scope of the recast EIR. 38 This is for political reasons only: the UK was interested in continuing to 'supply' the Scheme to foreign companies without these companies having to move their COMI to the UK, i.e. without being forced to incur significant transaction costs. The other Member States apparently were happy with this situation.
The second important structural change to the EIR relates to the treatment of members of groups of companies who simultaneously find themselves in financial distress. As was already mentioned (see Section 4 supra), forum shopping in such a setting often is motivated by the desire to bring all proceedings in one jurisdiction and achieve some procedural coordination and associated efficiency gains. The recast EIR attempts to address this issue by a lengthy new section (Chapter V) on "Insolvency Proceedings of Members of a Group of
Companies" (Articles 56-77). The new provisions are not very useful: the coordination mechanism is bureaucratic, and it will be cumbersome to use it. To the best of my knowledge, the new tool has yet to be applied in a cross-border restructuring case.
Finally, the recast EIR acknowledges that forum shopping need not always be harmful.
It can be beneficial in the sense that it is done to increase the net assets available for distribution amongst a distressed firm's creditors. Hence, the European lawmaker has introduced new rules designed to prevent only abusive forum shopping (see Recital 29). The 'original' EIR had established a rebuttable presumption that a company's COMI is in the place of its registered office. According to the recast EIR, the registered office of a company is presumed to be the COMI only "… if [it] has not been moved to another Member State within the 3-month period prior to the request for the opening of insolvency proceedings" Taken together, these provisions aim to make sure that a firm's COMI is 'taken seriously' by Member States' insolvency courts. That neither rules out COMI changes nor 37 From a policy perspective, the inclusion of not fully collective proceedings within the scope of the recast EIR is problematic: it forces Member States to automatically recognise decisions in such proceedings (Articles 19, 32)-like enforceable domestic judgments-despite the fact that the debtor company may not be insolvent and the proceeding does not attempt to solve a common pool problem, see Eidenmüller (2018a) . 38 See Recital 16 of the Regulation and Annex A (the Scheme of Arrangement is not listed in Annex A, and such listing is decisive with respect to the Regulation's scope, see Article 1(1) last sentence).
makes such changes more burdensome. It does not even hinder abusive COMI shifts. The only effect of the provisions is that Member States' courts look more closely to where the COMI (now) really is, and that they must do so especially if the COMI has been shifted on the eve of an insolvency filing.
I hypothesise that the overall effect of the recast EIR on forum shopping and regulatory competition in corporate insolvency law in Europe will be minimal. The recast EIR does bring pre-insolvency restructurings within the scope of the Regulation so that these must now automatically be recognised everywhere in the EU. However, the dominant competitor in the pre-insolvency restructuring market is the UK, and the recast EIR does not change the crossborder legal regime applicable to Schemes of Arrangement. The new group coordination procedure aims to reduce the incentive to forum shop in cases of group restructurings.
However, the new procedure is much too cumbersome to be useful. Finally, the new provisions on jurisdiction might make forum shopping on the eve of an insolvency filing a little bit more difficult by watering down the relevance of the registered office as a presumption of a firm's COMI. At the same time, COMI shifts are possible even on the eve of insolvency, and benevolent forum shopping is not discouraged.
The European Restructuring Directive (2019)
The European Restructuring Directive was long in the making. It all started with a Recommendation of the European Commission in 2014, calling upon the Member States to modernise their national restructuring laws. 39 The Member States were unimpressed, so the Commission followed up with a proposal for a European Restructuring Directive in 2016.
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The guiding idea was to give SMEs local access to pre-insolvency restructurings. As already discussed, forum shopping is relatively (and much) more expensive for SMEs than for large firms (see Section 4 supra).
There was much to criticise about the Commission's proposal: 41 it was flawed because it would have created a refuge for failing firms that should be liquidated; flawed because it ruled out going-concern sales for viable firms and because it was, in essence, a twisted and truncated insolvency proceeding-it looked like a Chapter 11 proceeding but without strong court involvement from the beginning and without the tools needed for the court to guarantee a fair outcome of the process. administrative authority or a cross-class cram-down is part of the plan confirmation process.
This requirement restricts contractual freedom, reduces flexibility and makes the restructuring process more complicated and costly. Engaging advisors or experts should have been left to the participating stakeholders as it is in a Chapter 11 or a Scheme of Arrangement process.
Another 'political price' the European law-maker had to pay for getting the ERD adopted is a serious compromise to the harmonisation goal that was driving the project from the beginning. The Directive contains more than 70 regulatory options for the Member
States
. 45 So what we can expect is that Member States will use the remaining freedom they have to 'experiment away' from the inefficient proceeding forced upon them by the European law-maker. Also, the institutional environment-courts, insolvency professionals, etc.-is absolutely crucial for the proper functioning of insolvency or restructuring processes, 46 and this environment differs significantly amongst the Member States. Incentives to forum shop will, therefore, continue to exist even after Member States have implemented the ERD.
At the same time, it is clear that the ERD will bring about some harmonisation. It will, to a non-trivial degree, reduce Member States' room to experiment with innovative and potentially radical new types of restructuring procedures. The ERD is a Procrustean bed that rules out radical innovations with respect to corporate restructuring regimes. In the future, for example, efficient regimes will not only be digital ones-these regimes will probably also, to a significant degree, be automated and assisted by artificial intelligence. This is impossible with the ERD as the relevant governing platform.
As a consequence, the ERD will reduce forum shopping and regulatory competition with respect to corporate restructurings in the European Union. Were the UK to stay in the EU, it would force the 'market leader' to change its flagship product, the Scheme of Arrangement, at least to a certain degree-reducing the pressure on the other Member States to modernise their regimes and make them more efficient. Unfortunately, the negative effects on the market for corporate restructurings might be even more profound-because of Brexit. 
Brexit (2019)
As things stand as I write this (May 2019), the UK is set to leave the EU on 1 November 2019. 47 Indeed, Boris Johnson, probably the main contender for the jobs of leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister, has just announced that "[w]e will leave the EU on 31
October, deal or no deal." 48 As with almost everything about Brexit, this is subject to change at short notice. At the same time, it now seems highly likely that Brexit will (eventually)
happen.
The key question for the purposes of this essay then becomes: how will this affect the framework conditions for the market for corporate restructurings and regulatory competition in corporate insolvency law in Europe? The answer to this question is much clearer than the question of Brexit itself. As I have analysed elsewhere in detail, 49 after a possible transition period of a couple of years to a possible agreement on the future relationship between the EU and the UK, there is nothing in the documents discussed so far to suggest that the EIR/Brussels Ia Regulation would be replaced by a bilateral arrangement with similar effect.
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Given its position as a highly popular venue for corporate restructurings/litigations in the EU, the UK clearly does have an interest in such an alternative regime. However, the other Member States do not share this interest.
The consequences of this are straightforward: restructuring decisions by English courts will no longer benefit from automatic recognition under the EIR/Brussels Ia Regulations.
Courts of EU Member States will decide autonomously, based on their respective national civil procedure rules for cross-border cases, whether or not to recognise English court decisions. This applies also to those EU Member States which have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Law: the Model Law does not foresee automatic recognition. Rather, recognition is the consequence of a decision which may or may not been granted on an application to the competent court, depending on whether certain requirements have been fulfilled (or not). 63 The effect of these dynamics will probably not so much lie in another
European jurisdiction taking the place of the UK as the European "restructuring capital". We do not see an uptick in Irish Scheme cases that could or would make up for the decline in the popularity of the UK Scheme of Arrangement. Rather, these dynamics will primarily reduce the incentive to forum shop to the UK in cross-border cases and get a domestic restructuring instead ('defensive regulatory competition').
Legally speaking, this all depends on the UK, in fact, exiting the EU-with the associated changes in the applicable framework for cross-border restructurings already described. At the same time, it is not unlikely that the observable drop in popularity of the English Scheme of Arrangement after 2016 can already be attributed to anticipated (and discounted) future changes. After all, the whole Brexit process is fraught with political and legal uncertainties, and this may also tip the balance on the margin against forum shopping to the UK already now.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have discussed the rise and fall of regulatory competition in corporate insolvency law in the European Union. I have also attempted to discuss fundamental conceptual issues relating to a normative assessment of the 'market for corporate The European law-maker still struggles to find a consistent approach to the fundamental issue of harmonisation versus regulatory competition-in corporate (insolvency) law as elsewhere. In corporate insolvency law, for example, the recast EIR now explicitly acknowledges that forum shopping and the associated regulatory competition may be a good thing. At the same time, the European lawmaker is now harmonising Member States' preinsolvency restructuring frameworks, edging out differences and reducing the incentive to forum shop and the associated regulatory competition. This is unfortunate. The ERD is an inefficient and harmful piece of legislation-it should be repealed.
However, the real nail in the coffin for regulatory competition in corporate insolvency law in the EU will probably come with Brexit. It will eliminate the dominant competitor and standard setter in the European restructuring market. There is not much the EU can do about this. Brexit is an act of harm inflicted by the UK upon itself. 
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